One way to Palestinian autonomy

 Over July 28-30, a ministerial conference at the UN, representing 17 countries and the Arab League but boycotted by the US and Israel, produced the “New York Declaration." This document set out a phased roadmap leading to a demilitarized sovereign Palestinian state, the disarmament of Hamas, the release of the hostages, PA reforms, and post-conflict planning. 

A follow-up summit on Palestinian statehood is scheduled for September 22, to be held on the sidelines of the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly. This ministerial conference will, it is reported, establish a 19-member committee, co-led by France and Saudi Arabia, charged with creating a coordinated, time-bound international framework for advancing the two-state solution.

International players rarely acknowledge the existential danger Israel would face if this snake oil panacea for all the ills of the Middle East did not incorporate cast-iron security guarantees for Israel. Foremost among the dangers are the geographic and strategic realities. 

A Palestinian state would control territory only a few kilometers from Israel’s industrial and population heartland. For example, at some points, the eastern suburbs of Tel Aviv are only some 12 km. from the West Bank border. An Islamist takeover of a new Palestine, either by force or – given the popularity of Hamas and its like – by election, is a real possibility. 

If that happened, Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion Airport, and Haifa could be under daily missile threat. From the West Bank’s high ground, rockets or even mortars could reach major cities in under a minute.

Do the two-state advocates take into account that without complete demilitarization and effective border security, a new Palestinian state would simply represent a convenient launchpad for future attacks on Israel? Should extremist groups seize power, an armed enemy state would exist permanently on Israel’s doorstep.

The bottom line is that a naive two-state arrangement without guaranteed arrangements that address demilitarization, counterterrorism cooperation and secure borders would create a Gaza-like scenario in the West Bank. If such a Palestinian state were to be established, Israel would face genuine existential dangers. 

Two-state solution considerations

There is another factor in play. Supporters of the two-state solution must also take into account that Jordan would not regard with unmitigated pleasure the establishment of a Palestinian state on its doorstep, unless it was hedged about with effective safeguards preventing its takeover by jihadists.

Jordan already hosts over two million registered Palestinian refugees, while people of Palestinian descent comprise up to a half of Jordan’s population. 

Jordanian leaders from King Abdullah downward are on record expressing fears of a further mass displacement into Jordan, which they describe as an existential threat that could upset the demographic balance of the state and impose unsustainable financial strains. They also fear cross-border violence, arms smuggling, and terrorist threats.

So although official Jordanian policy supports the two-state solution, its leaders are wary that unresolved issues around refugees, Jerusalem, borders, and security – as yet unaddressed by peace negotiations – could endanger its vital interests. 

Moreover, both in official government statements and through repeated public declarations by its leadership, Jordan has rejected in advance any two-state arrangement that does not incorporate Jordan’s direct input.

Does any sort of mechanism exist that could ensure an independent Palestine but also provide Israel and Jordan with cast-iron guarantees of security and protection from all existential danger?

On May 14, 2015 noted Israeli politician, Yossi Beilin – friend and close associate of Shimon Peres and trusted colleague of Yitzhak Rabin – wrote an article for The New York Times that has become seminal. Under the headline, “Confederation is the Key to Mideast Peace,” he wrote: “This idea isn’t new. For a brief time in the 1990s, it animated some of my earliest discussions about peace with a spokesman whom Palestinians revered, Faisal al-Husseini. 

“But that was before the Oslo Accords of 1993… In hindsight, it is clear that we should have been looking all along at confederation – cohabitation, not divorce.”

The confederation model

What is a confederation? It is a form of government in which constituent sovereign states maintain their independence while merging certain aspects of administration, such as security, defense, economic, or administrative matters. 

A good example is the confederation formed by the seceding states during the American Civil War. In a federation on the other hand, such as the modern United States, the constituent parts may be fiercely independent, but they are not sovereign, and the emphasis is on the supremacy of the central government. 

The vision of achieving peace between Israel and the Palestinians through the mechanism of a confederation has its supporters, even, surprisingly, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. In 2018, when the Trump peace proposals were being drawn up, Abbas was asked his views on the idea. He is on record as favoring a three-way confederation of Jordan, Israel, and a sovereign Palestine. 

Given Jordan’s collaboration, a post-war conference could be dedicated to establishing a new legal entity – a confederation incorporating Jordan, Israel, and a Palestinian state, including the Gaza Strip, which could be brought into existence at the same moment as the confederation itself. 

This three-state confederation could, on a small scale, copy the European Union, in which nation states, while retaining full sovereignty, agree to collaborate in certain spheres such as security, defense, economic development or infrastructure.

The confederation might have among its founding principles the establishment of a collaborative system dedicated to providing hi-tech security and economic growth for all its component states. 

Such an umbrella entity might also undertake to establish a pragmatic status for Jerusalem, and especially its Old City, satisfactory to all parties. 

The Israel Defense Forces would act in collaboration with the forces of the other parties to guarantee the security of Israel and that of the confederation as a whole.

With genuine acceptance of Israel as a permanent presence in the Middle East, a three-state confederation covering the whole of what was originally Mandate Palestine might open a hitherto unexplored path leading toward a peaceful and thriving future. 

It could set as its objective the transformation of the region within, say, 10 years, into a thriving financial, commercial, and industrial hub to the benefit of all its citizens – Jordanian, Israeli, and Palestinian alike. 

While support for an overriding confederation allying Jordan, Israel, and a sovereign Palestinian state appears occasionally in policy discussions, think-tank papers, and media debates, it is not an official position of any government. Yet it has the potential to overcome many of the problems associated with simply establishing a stand-alone state of Palestine. 

Therefore, it perhaps merits serious consideration – not least by those ministers attending the projected summit on September 22.